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2Abstract
Modern developments in population dynamics emphasize the role of the
turnover of individuals. In the new approaches stable population size is a
dynamic equilibrium between different mortality and fecundity factors in-
stead of an arbitrary fixed carrying capacity. The latest replicator dynamics
models assume that regulation of the population size acts through feedback
driven by density dependent juvenile mortality. Here, we consider a sim-
plified model to extract the properties of this approach. We show that at
the stable population size, the structure of the frequency dependent evolu-
tionary game emerges. Turnover of individuals induces a lottery mechanism
where for each nest site released by a dead adult individual a single newborn
is drawn from the pool of newborn candidates. This frequency dependent
selection leads toward the strategy maximizing the number of newborns per
adult death. However, multiple strategies can maximize this value. Among
them, the strategy with the greatest mortality (which implies the great-
est instantaneous growth rate) is selected. This result is important for the
discussion about universal fitness measures and which parameters are maxi-
mized by natural selection. This is related to the fitness measures R0 and r,
because the number of newborns per single dead individual equals lifetime
production of newborn R0 in models without ageing. We thus have a two-
stage procedure, instead of a single fitness measure, which is a combination
of R0 and r. According to the nest site lottery mechanism, at stable pop-
ulation size, selection favours strategies with the greatest r, i.e. those with
the highest turnover, from those with the greatest R0.
3Keywords: density dependence, logistic equation, frequency dependent
selection, life history, evolutionary game, fitness measures
1. Introduction
In the modern theory of evolutionary ecology (Post and Palkovacs 2009,
Pelletier et al. 2009, Morris 2011, Schoener 2011) the problem of eco-
evolutionary feedback is of special interest. One of the major theoretical
problems in the modelling of population dynamics, and in general of evo-
lutionary biology and ecology, is the limit of population growth and its
selection consequences. This topic is very important in many disciplines
such as evolutionary game theory and life history theory.
The earliest attempt to solve this problem for populations with overlap-
ping generations is the continuous logistic equation introduced by Verhulst
in the 19th century (Verhulst, 1838), which can be found in every textbook
on ecology and mathematical biology. It inspired the idea of r and K selec-
tion (McArthur and Wilson 1967), that selection favours different strategies
at low densities and near the stable population size, and is still applied in
modelling (Cressman et al. 2004, Cressman and Krivan 2006, Cressman
and Krivan 2010). This concept states that there is some arbitrary maximal
population size at which growth is suppressed and the population remains
stable. However, this approach produces some unusual predictions which
provoked a wide discussion (Koz lowski 1980,  Lomnicki 1988, Kuno 1991,
Ginzburg 1992, Gabriel 2005, Hui 2006, Argasinski and Koz lowski 2008)
presented in the next section.
4The problem of the limits to growth is important not only for ecological
population growth models but also for the modelling of natural selection.
There is huge discussion on what is maximized by natural selection and
what happens when a population reaches the limit to growth (Metz et al.
1992, Koz lowski 1993, Mylius and Diekmann 1995, Brommer 2000, Dieck-
mann and Metz 2006, Metz et al. 2008, Roff 2008). However in these
attempts density dependence is represented by some abstract unspecified
factors. Thus the proposed solutions are very general and abstract. A
concrete mechanistic interpretation should be helpful in the interpretation
of the mathematical notions. In the modification of the logistic equation
(Koz lowski 1980, Hui 2006) which was applied to game-theoretic modelling
(Argasinski and Koz lowski 2008, Argasinski and Broom 2012) there is an
example of a mechanism responsible for strategically neutral density depen-
dence called in this paper a ”nest site lottery”. The underlying assumption
is that there is a limited number of nest sites in the environment and that ev-
ery newborn must find a nest site to survive. Thus all newborns produced at
some moment in time form a pool of candidates to be drawn from to replace
the dead individuals in their nest sites. The difference is that in this case
there is an arbitrary maximal population size described by a carrying capac-
ity indicating the number of available nest sites (mechanistically interpreted
as nests or holes, where individual can settle, as in Hui 2006). However,
the stable population size is not the carrying capacity, as in the classical
logistic equation, but the dynamic equilibrium between different factors of
mortality and fecundity (Koz lowski 1980, Ginzburg 1992, Hui 2006), which
5can be affected by the dynamics of the population state (Argasinski and
Broom 2012). The advantage of this approach is that it considers a realistic
turnover of individuals (Argasinski and Koz lowski 2008). In this paper we
will more rigorously analyze the properties of the nest site lottery mechanism
in a simpler model than in the previous papers (Argasinski and Koz lowski
2008, Argasinski and Broom 2012).
Below we give the mathematical details of this approach (sections 2 and
3). Section 4 starts the development of the selection model and in section
5 the important notion of the turnover coefficient is introduced. Section 6
contains the presentation of the selection dynamics. In section 7 the rela-
tionships between the nest site lottery mechanism and the invasion fitness
concept are presented. Section 8 contains the main results which are the
equations (14, 15) and their analysis describing the nest site lottery mech-
anism (intuitively depicted in fig. 1). We see that, eventually, selection
favours the strategy with the highest turnover coefficient out of those with
the greatest value of lifetime reproduction. The mechanistic reasoning from
section 8 is completed by Theorem 1 describing the quantitative character-
ization of the restpoints of the system (14, 15). The importance of the ob-
tained results and the general ideas inspired by them is discussed in section
9 (the last subsection contains a discussion on the two-stage maximization
procedure, substituting for the single-step fitness measure, obtained by our
results).
62. Density dependence
The cornerstone of mathematical ecology is the Malthusian equation de-
scribing exponential population growth,
(1)
dn
dt
= nr = nb− nd = n (b− d) ,
where b is the birth rate and d is the death rate. However, in Argasin-
ski and Broom (2012, see Appendix 1 there for details) it was shown that
with respect to the multiplicative proportionality constant (which can be
removed using a change of timescale) acting as the rate of interaction oc-
currence, these parameters can be interpreted as demographic parameters
describing the outcomes of the average interaction with elements of the en-
vironment or other individuals. Then b ∈ [0,∞) can be interpreted as the
number of newborns produced during an interaction event and d ∈ [0, 1]
as the probability of death during an interaction event. We will assume
this mechanistic interpretation in our model. Thus the Malthusian coeffi-
cient r can be interpreted as the balance between mortality d and fertility
b. The above model is not realistic, because it allows for infinite popula-
tion growth. The classical solution of this problem is the use of the logistic
equation, which is equation (2),
(2)
dn
dt
= nr
(
1−
n
K
)
.
However, this relies on a problematic assumption which has very serious
consequences. Equation (2) produces artifacts in population growth mod-
els (Kuno 1991, Gabriel 2005) and selection models related to replicator
dynamics (Argasinski and Koz lowski 2008). For example, it suppresses the
7selection dynamics in the replicator dynamics by setting the right hand sides
of the strategy dynamics equations to 0 (Argasinski and Koz lowski 2008),
the trajectory escapes to infinity for r < 0 (i.e. b < d) and initial popula-
tion size greater than K (known as Levins’ paradox, (Gabriel 2005)) or the
trajectory decreases with increasing rate for r < 0 and initial population
size slightly smaller than K (Kuno 1991). This is caused by the fact that
the term r is multiplied by the suppression coefficient, which implies that
with population growth, both mortality and fertility decrease, and mortality
decreasing with increasing population size and reaching zero at equilibrium
is biologically counterintuitive. Mortality should not decrease with popula-
tion growth and individuals cannot be immortal at equilibrium. The above
problems suggest that models should rely on clear and mechanistic assump-
tions (Geritz and Kisdi 2012). Thus, density dependent suppression should
act only on the number of juveniles recruited to the population (Koz lowski
1980, Ginzburg 1992) and the initial population size should be smaller than
the carrying capacity (Hui 2006, Argasinski and Koz lowski 2008, Argasinski
and Broom 2012) leading to
(3) n˙ = n
(
b
(
1−
n
K
)
− d
)
,
where the suppression term (1− n/K) describes newborns’ survival prob-
ability. This provides an important distinction between newborn candidates
introduced to the environment (described by per capita number b) and re-
cruited newborns, survivors of the density dependent stage (described by
b
(
1−
n
K
)
).
8This problem was emphasized by Koz lowski (1980) for the first time, but
surprisingly this paper did not get as wide an appreciation as it deserved.
This problem was also mentioned in the classical book ”Population Ecol-
ogy of Individuals” ( Lomnicki 1988). Then it was reinvented by Ginzburg
(1992), but (3) was rejected there as it “disagrees with our intuition about
unchanging equilibrium ”. Hui (2006) argued, against Ginsburg’s claim,
that (3) is the proper approach and should be substituted for (2). The dis-
cussion started by Ginzburg also did not receive wide attention. Argasinski
and Koz lowski (2008) then applied equation (3) to avoid the suppression of
selection that occurs after the equilibrium size is reached caused by equation
(2) without knowledge of this discussion, and (3) is a cornerstone of the eco-
logically realistic approach to dynamic evolutionary games (Argasinski and
Broom 2012). Then (3) was mentioned as an example of the proper mecha-
nistic approach (Geritz and Kisdi 2012), but not as the general alternative
to (2). However, we believe that (3) deserves much stronger attention from
a general audience.
Although (3) has been applied in complex selection models (Argasinski
and Koz lowski 2008, Zhang and Hui 2011, Argasinski and Broom 2012),
the selection consequences of this approach have not been rigorously ana-
lyzed, since previous papers (Kuno 1991, Ginzburg 1992, Gabriel 2005, Hui
2006) focused on population density dynamics and ecological aspects. This
distinction between adults and newborn candidates is very important for
ecological and evolutionary reasoning, because differences between juvenile
9and adult mortality can have serious selection consequences. For exam-
ple, a lack of mortality differences means that a small fecundity advantage
can favour evolution of semelparity over iteroparity (this problem is known
as Coles Paradox, Cole 1954), while mortality differences can significantly
change the situation (Charnov and Shaffer 1973). The selection mechanism
induced by (3) is thus very interesting and will be analyzed in later sections.
3. The population in equilibrium
We can calculate equilibrium size, by setting the right hand side of Equa-
tion (3) to be equal to 0, which gives either n = 0 or
(4) n˜ =
(
1−
d
b
)
K.
Note that for positive n˜, the condition b > d should be satisfied. After
substitution of n˜ into the logistic coefficient (1− n/K), we obtain the equi-
librium newborn survival probability d/b. This is reasonable; due to the
turnover of individuals, in any short time interval for every nb newborns we
have nd dead individuals. Thus nd/nb describes the number of newborns
competing for each single nest site vacated by a dead individual. Only
one newborn can settle in a single place, thus each newborn can survive
with probability d/b. This newborn survival should be valid for any density
dependent mortality acting on juveniles, not only for logistic suppression,
because only in this case does fertility equal overall mortality.
4. The case of multiple individual strategies
Assume that there are different individual phenotypes i = 1, . . . ,H each
characterized by per capita reproduction bi and mortality di. Thus every
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strategy is described by a two dimensional vector vi = [bi, di] ∈ ([0,∞) × [0, 1])
describing demographic parameters interpreted as in (1). Note that K de-
scribes the number of nest sites and is the same for all phenotypes. Denoting
n =
∑
i ni and qi =
ni
n
, we can describe the following dynamics:
(5)
dni
dt
= ni
(
bi
(
1−
n
K
)
− di
)
.
The value ni increases with time if
(6) n <
(
1−
di
bi
)
K
and decreases in the opposite case. Thus for every strategy there is a critical
population size which is a threshold between regions of growth and decline.
Above the population size critical for a particular strategy, the effective
fertility bi
(
1−
n
K
)
will be smaller than the mortality di. Thus the dynamics
of the population size plays an important role, which is described by the
equation
dn
dt
=
∑
i
n˙i =
∑
i
ni
(
bi
(
1−
n
K
)
− di
)
= n
((
1−
n
K
)∑
i
qibi −
∑
i
qidi
)
,
giving
(7)
dn
dt
= n
((
1−
n
K
)
b¯− d¯
)
,
where b¯(q) =
∑
i qibi and d¯(q) =
∑
i qidi. We can easily calculate that
in this case, instead of reaching the stable equilibrium, the population size
converges to the stationary density manifold (Cressman et al 2001,Cressman
11
and Garay 2003a and b)
(8) n˜ =
(
1−
d¯
b¯
)
K,
the form of which is conditional on the strategy frequencies. Thus we in-
troduced diversity among individual strategies to our model. In our model,
in the general case, newborn survival
(
1−
n
K
)
is a phenomenological func-
tion, linear with respect to the fraction of free nest sites. Thus in this
approach the recruitment probability equals the probability of finding a free
nest site in a single trial. This is a very specific mechanism which will not
be suitable for many species. However, similar mechanisms will work for
any density dependent factor u(n) acting on births that is monotonically
decreasing with respect to n. Then for growth rate biu(n)− di, the critical
population size will be n = u−1
(
di
bi
)
. The newly produced offspring of
the carriers of the different strategies form a pool of candidates from which
randomly drawn individuals will be recruited to settle in the available nest
sites. This is the core of the ”nest site lottery” mechanism which will be
analyzed in the following sections. Note that equations (5) and (7) suggest
the importance of the factors
di
bi
and
d¯
b¯
. This will be analyzed in the next
section.
5. The turnover coefficient L
Here we will introduce an important characterization of population dy-
namics. We shall define the function L(v) = b/d for a single strategy v.
L describes the number of newborns per single dead individual, which we
shall refer to as the turnover coefficient (for the relationship of the turnover
12
coefficient with lifetime reproduction, see the Discussion). Surprisingly, a
similar coefficient describing the energy allocated to reproduction divided
by mortality can be found in life history papers (Taylor and Williams 1984,
Koz lowski 1992, Koz lowski 1996, Werner and Anholt 1993, Perrin and Sibly
1993, for an overview see Koz lowski 2006). Analogously, for a mixture of
strategies where v¯(q) =
∑
i qivi = [b¯, d¯] is the average strategy contained in
the convex hull of the strategies vi (see fig. 1), we define L(v¯(q)) = b¯/d¯.
Thus
(9)
L(v¯(q)) =
b¯
d¯
=
∑
i qibi∑
i qidi
=
∑
i qidiL(vi)∑
i qidi
=
∑
i
qidi∑
j qjdj
L(vi) =
∑
i
yiL(vi),
which is a weighted average of the L(vi)s and yi = qidi/
∑
j qjdj describes
the fraction of i strategists among individuals dying during a small time
interval ∆t (according to Appendix A, A.2). L(v¯(q)) is thus the average L
among dead adult individuals. The L-function can be useful in describing
the multiplicative newborn survival (recruitment probability) because after
substitution of the stable population size n˜ into the logistic suppression
coefficient we obtain:
(10)
(
1−
n˜
K
)
= d¯/b¯,
which can be denoted as 1/L(v¯(q)).
If there is any variation in the L(vi)s, then we have that b¯/d¯ lies strictly
between the smallest and largest values of L, Lmin < b¯/d¯ < Lmax. L(v)
describes the number of newborn candidates produced per single dead indi-
vidual for the strategy v = [b, d], during ∆t. When the strategic argument
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is the averaged vector, describing a population with a mixture of strategies,
then the value of L is the average number of newborn candidates produced
per single dead individual in this population. When the population is in size
equilibrium (at the stationary density manifold), then the newborn survival
component can be described by the value of L of the average population
strategy; thus it becomes frequency dependent.
6. Selection dynamics
The behaviour of equation (5) suggests frequency dependent self-regulation
of the population state. Equation (7) shows attraction to the stable size
manifold (8), which suggests that the dynamics on this manifold should be
analyzed. To describe the frequency dependent selection associated with the
system we have presented, tools appropriate to game dynamics are required.
Thus we should describe the population in terms of the strategy frequencies
qi and the population size n. However, at the stable size manifold the pop-
ulation size is given by (10). We can assume that the strategies are close
enough to each other that a separation of timescales between fast n dynam-
ics and q dynamics occurs. Then we can assume that selection occurs on the
stationary size manifold. Now we can describe the selection process realized
by the ”nest site lottery” mechanism. Thus using (10), we can write the
selection dynamics from (5) as
(11)
dni
dt
= ni
(
bi
d¯(q)
b¯(q)
− di
)
.
Because the average growth rate on the stable size manifold is zero then
the equation (11) can be replaced by the replicator dynamics (see Appendix
14
A)
(12)
dqi
dt
= qi
(
bi
d¯(q)
b¯(q)
− di
)
= qidi
(
L(vi)
L(v¯(q))
− 1
)
.
Therefore the growth rate of the i-th strategy becomes a function of the
strategy frequencies q (frequency dependent):
M(vi, q) = bi
d¯ (q)
b¯ (q)
− di = di
(
L(vi)
L(v¯(q))
− 1
)
,
and by equations (7) and (8) the stationary population size manifold is
described by
n˜ =
(
1−
d¯ (q)
b¯ (q)
)
K =
(
1−
1
L(v¯(q))
)
K.
Note that the growth rate functionM describes a mixture of all mortality
and fecundity components, not only the density independent mortality d and
fecundity b as in the Malthusian parameter r. The growth rate is positive
when L(vi) > L(v¯(q)), which implies that
(13)
bi
di
>
∑
j qjbj∑
j qjdj
.
Thus there is a threshold between regions of growth (strategies with repro-
ductive surplus) and reduction (strategies with death rate exceeding birth
rate) which has the linear form bi = L(
∑
j qjvj)di (see Figure 1). The thresh-
old describes the set of strategies for which the growth rate M(vi, q) equals
0. Frequencies qi of strategies vi with a greater value of L than the aver-
age strategy
∑
j qjvj will increase under the replicator dynamics. In effect
the averaged strategy shifts towards those strategies because it is a linear
combination of the strategies present in the population. This implies an
15
increase of L of the average strategy (see Figure 1). However, among grow-
ing strategies, the greatest growth rate is by the strategy with the greatest
coefficient M(vi, q). Because in this case the dynamics is on the stationary
density manifold, the current population size is very close to (8) and (13) is
equivalent to satisfying inequality (6) (passing the critical population size).
Thus at the stationary size manifold the threshold between the growth and
decline of the strategy frequency is equivalent to the threshold between the
growth and decline of the number of carriers of that strategy (this may not
be satisfied far from the stationary size manifold). Frequency dependence
induces an increase of the slope of the threshold which eventually leads to
the selection of the strategy with the greatest L, which confirms the result
of Mylius and Diekmann (1995). Note that their second result, that density
dependent adult mortality leads simply to r maximization as in unlimited
growth models, directly comes from the independence of the replicator dy-
namics from background fitness.
7. The monomorphic resident-mutant case
We can simplify the above model by assuming a monomorphic population
invaded by a rare mutant; thus this resembles the classical ESS approach
(Maynard Smith 1982) in the context of life history evolution (Charlesworth
& Leon 1976, Mylius and Diekmann 1995). In the limiting case where the
strategy trait tends to zero, we approach the method known as invasion
analysis which is the cornerstone of adaptive dynamics (Dieckmann and
Law 1996, Metz et al. 1996, Geritz et al. 1998, Dercole and Rinaldi 2008).
Using Equation (12), the resident growth rate is zero and the rare mutant
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growth rate function M is bmut(dres/bres)− dmut which must be positive to
invade the population. Thus the equilibrium population size increases.
To be an ESS itself, the “mutant” population should be stable against
the previous resident, and thus:
bres
dmut
bmut
− dres < 0⇒
bres
dres
<
bmut
dmut
,
which is the same condition. Thus in both cases we obtain Lres < Lmut.
Note that, when we consider only the death component of the Malthusian
equation then we obtain the equation n˙ = −nd; thus this is an exponential
decay with decay constant d, and so the average lifetime of the individual
is κ = 1/d. In any short time interval of length ∆t, for every nb newborns
we have nd dead individuals. We can change the timescale to set ∆t as
the new time unit. Then initial rates, and thus respective births and deaths
numbers, should be multiplied by some timescale specific constant. However
this constant cancels out in L(v). Thus L(v) is the lifetime reproduction
R0. Therefore we have obtained for the ”nest site lottery” mechanism,
the classical result that under limited growth only lifetime reproduction
is maximized and there is no selection pressure on the lifespan. However
this occurs only in a monomorphic resident-mutant model. The case of a
population composed of an arbitrary number of individual strategies is more
interesting.
17
8. Multiple strategies with L = Lmax
We have seen that evolution leads to the fixation of the strategy with the
largest value of L, Lmax. What if there is more than one such strategy?
The following question arises: is there selection between strategies with the
same L? We can show this by applying a multipopulation game-theoretic
approach (Appendix A and Argasinski 2006) and divide strategies present
in the population among subpopulations with the same L, but different
ds (Appendix B). Assume than we have m such classes with Hj different
strategies in the j-th L-class (then the lower strategy index descxribes the
number within the particular L-class and the upper strategy index describes
the L-class). Then for all strategies (for all i) from the same L-class L(vji ) =
Lj. When we assume that the dynamics is on the stable density manifold,
we obtain the following equations
dqji
dt
= qji
(
Lj
L(v¯(q))
− 1
)(
dji −
∑
w
qjwd
j
w
)
,(14)
dgj
dt
= gj
(
Lj
L(v¯(q))
− 1
)∑
w
qjwd
j
w,(15)
describing the changes of the proportion of the i-th strategy within the
j-th L-class (Equation 14) described by qji and related frequencies between
L-classes (15) described by gj . Thus selection between L-classes is driven
by the first bracketed term from Equation (14) and affects both intra- and
inter-group dynamics. However, there is selection inside each L-class toward
greater d. When suboptimal L-classes are outcompeted, the intrinsic selec-
tion driven by the bracket
(
dji −
∑
qjwd
j
w
)
is also suppressed. The form of
Equation (15) shows that among growing L-classes, those with smaller L
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can grow faster than those with larger, due to a greater
∑
qjwd
j
w, until they
fall under the L-selection threshold.
We are interested in analyzing which strategy (strategies) will dominate
the population in the long term. In particular, q˙i in Equation (12) is al-
ways positive if strategy i has L(vi) = Lmax, whenever there is variation
in the L values in the population. Thus the proportions of such strategies
increase; but also, following Equation (14), the strategies out of these with
the largest values of di increase the fastest. Thus if there is either repeated
small mutations involving strategies with L(vi) < Lmax or a constant low
level of mutation involving a mix of strategies making L(v¯(q)) < Lmax,
the population will evolve to the strategy out of those with L(vi) = Lmax
such that di takes the largest value. Thus repeated mutations or invasions
of suboptimal strategies induce selection towards maximal d among Lmax
strategists. It is easy to show that in the absence of density dependent
suppression, this strategy has the greatest r but only among Lmax strate-
gies, since bi = diLmax. The strategies from other L-classes can have even
greater r, but they will be outcompeted by the mechanism described by the
bracketed term in equation (12). In the case when the population consists
only of the Lmax individuals, the same outcome can be caused by repeated
ecological catastrophes leading to a decrease of the population size. Then
the strategy with the greatest di will have the greatest growth rate during
the growth phase of the population.
However, let us focus on the evolution of the system under the repli-
cator dynamics in a single particular “turn”, during which no mutation
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occurs. Suppose that there are precisely I strategies in the Lmax-class,
and assume that the initial state of the Lmax-class is described by vector
q = (qmax
1
(0), . . . , qmaxI (0)) and initial relative size gmax.
Theorem 1
The replicator dynamics converges to the vector
q = (qmax
1
(0)gmax(0)λ
d1 , . . . , qmaxI (0)gmax(0)λ
dI ),
where λ is a constant that satisfies the equation gmax(0)
∑I
i=1 qi(0)λ
di = 1.
For the proof see Appendix C.
Theorem 1 shows that the restpoint describing the frequencies among
Lmax strategists is fully determined by the initial state of the Lmax-class and
its initial relative size qmax
1
(0). Despite frequency dependence, this occurs
independently of the initial frequencies of the other strategies (note that
in our model there are no direct interactions between individuals). Thus
calculation of q reduces to the finding of the appropriate value of λ. Note
that the rest point q can be interpreted as the state of the whole population
in general coordinates and the final state of the Lmax-class (then gmax = 1).
Note that if initially gmax(0) = 1, then obviously λ = 1. The parameter λ
can be described as the inflation coefficient because it inflates the frequencies
to sum them to one and compensate the impact of gmax(0).
9. Discussion
9.1. How the nest site lottery works? We started from the basic popu-
lation growth equation which is the cornerstone of the framework underlying
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evolutionary game theory and replicator dynamics (Maynard Smith 1982,
Cressman 1992, Hofbauer and Sigmund 1988 and 1998) and its more ecolog-
ically realistic extensions (Cressman and Garay 2003a,b, Argasinski 2006,
Argasinski and Koz lowski 2008, Argasinski and Broom 2012). We presented
an analysis of the dynamics of the mechanism inducing frequency dependent
selection toward the strategy maximizing the turnover coefficient L(vi).
This phenomenon can be explained mechanistically. All newborns in-
troduced into the population at the same moment in time form a pool of
candidates. Each newborn has equal probability to survive (find a nest
place), thus the strategy maximizing the number of newborns (trials) max-
imizes the fraction in the pool of candidates and in effect the amount of
survivors. However, every dead adult can be substituted by an individual
with any other strategy, thus each death is an additional free place in the
lottery. Thus it is profitable for the strategy carried by some subpopulation
to maximize the number of trials (newborns) per single offered place (dead
adult). In addition, we have shown that among strategies with the largest
value of the turnover coefficient Lmax there is a selection pressure toward the
strategy with the greatest d. This is intuitive from equation (12), because
for strategies with the maximal number of newborn candidates produced per
dead adult (i.e. maximizing the bracketed term in equation 12), the growth
rate will increase with the number of dead adults (described by the fraction
qidi in equation 12) since each of them will be exchanged for Lmax newborns
in the pool of candidates. Note that this provides a gene centered mecha-
nistic explanation of the phenomenon which can be naively interpreted in
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terms of group selection and an altruistic ”sacrifice” of adults, to release the
nest sites for juveniles.However, our model shows that it is an outcome of
”selfish” fitness maximization at the individual level. In addition our model
suggests a possible tradeoff in resource allocation between maximization of
the number of candidates in the nest site lottery and survival of the parental
individual.
9.2. Importance of the nest site lottery mechanism. The model pre-
sented in this paper is as simple as possible, to emphasize the mechanistic
aspects of the analyzed phenomenon. For example, there are no direct in-
teractions between individuals as in game-theoretic models. Our model has
an extremely simplified age structure consisting only of juveniles and adults
(more on the limitations of pure age-dependent models can be found in
Metz and Diekmann 1986). However, it was shown that the impact of den-
sity dependent factors (thus also the mechanism described in this paper and
its generalizations) can significantly affect and alter the outcomes of game-
theoretic models (Argasinski and Koz lowski 2008, Argasinski and Broom
2012). This is caused by the feedback driven by the fact that when popu-
lation size is on the stable size manifold every newborn should find a new
nest site vacated by a dead adult. Our model is the simple case example
of a one-dimensional monotone density dependence acting on the effective
birth rate (more on this and other general cases can be found in Metz et al
2008). However, as was shown at the end of section 4, our results can be
extrapolated to other factors that are monotonically decreasing with respect
to the population size, acting like juvenile survival. It is possible that other
22
environmental feedback loops of the same type to those in our model may
induce similar selection mechanisms.
The mechanism shown in this paper supports the intuition underlying r
and K selection theory (McArthur and Wilson 1967), that natural selection
favours different strategies in growing populations than in populations with
suppressed growth. The theoretical and methodological aspects of this ap-
proach were criticized (Barbault 1987, Getz 1993, Stearns 1977), however
as an intuition it still seems to be relevant (for modern approaches see for
example Metz et al. 2008). An alternative to the r and K approach is life
history theory (Roff 1992, Stearns 1992), where the problem of different se-
lection mechanisms in limited and unlimited populations also exists. Maybe
phenomena similar to those revealed by our simple model can be found in
other, more general or different specific models related to general population
dynamics, life history evolution, adaptive dynamics or population genetics.
This can be the subject of future research.
9.3. What is maximized by natural selection, and when? The exact
meaning of “fitness” is a subject of endless discussion (Metz et al. 1992,
Koz lowski 1993, Mylius and Diekmann 1995, Brommer 2000, Dieckmann
and Metz 2006, Metz et al. 2008, Roff 2008). Basically ”fitness” can be
defined as the instantaneous growth rate or invasion exponent (Metz 2008).
However, if eco-evolutionary feedback is of a particulary simple kind, the
optimization approach can be applied (Metz et al 2008, Gyllenberg et al
2011) where some ”fitness measures” or ”proxies” are maximized. There is
a widely known fact in life history theory that in a population with unlimited
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growth, the Malthusian growth rate r is a proper fitness measure, while on
the stable size manifold, lifetime production of newborns (before juvenile
mortality selection) R0 is the correct measure. In Mylius and Diekmann
(1995) there is a statement that the invasion fitness method (Metz et al.
1992) suggests that R0 and r are necessarily both maximal at the ESS
(although this statement is unclear since some strategies can maximize R0
and others can maximize r). Our results support this claim, and show that
an analogous mechanism can act in population dynamic and game-theoretic
models.
Here an important claim is that of Brommer and Kokko (2002), who say
that R0 is a rate independent reproductive measure which does not depend
on the timing of reproductive events. This is because R0 is described on
the lifespan timescale, not the population dynamic timescale like r. Despite
its simplified form our model can be a useful illustrative example for this
problem. How can we use a lifespan perspective in our approach? At first,
assume that population growth is unlimited (every newborn candidate can
find a nest site). Then demographic parameters b and d describing strategy
v, are constant and the average lifetime of the individual is κ(v) = 1/d (as
in section 7). Then r(v) = b− d = (L(v)− 1) /κ(v) and L(v) is the lifetime
reproduction R0 (or the average R0 among individuals dying during ∆t in
a population described by v). Therefore, the formula r = (L− 1) /κ shows
how the growth rate is affected by lifetime reproduction in the case of a
non-age structured population with unlimited growth. It shows that an in-
dividual should basically replace itself, but for the strategy growth rate to be
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positive requires a reproductive surplus during a lifetime. Now introduce the
limitation of the nest sites causing density dependent selection. Our results
show that under density dependence, the growth rates of the strategies are
affected by the frequency dependent surplus reducing mechanism, described
by newborn survival 1/L(v¯) which is the function of the other strategies
present in the population. In effect r(v) is replaced by density dependent
growth rate M(v, q) = (L(v)/L(v¯)− 1) /κ(v) and R0 = L(v)/L(v¯). Thus
the strategies maximizing the lifetime production of newborn candidates
L(v) will maximize R0 and the bracketed term of r(v). However among
L(v) maximizers, the strategy with smallest κ(v) will have greatest r(v).
9.4. Conclusion. Our simple model suggests an insight into the mechanis-
tic nature of selection under limited growth and has serious interpretational
consequences. It clearly shows that this problem should not be formulated
as the alternative: evolution maximizes r OR R0. In our simple model, when
the population reaches a stable size manifold, then a mechanism that mod-
ifies the r’s of competing strategies, which are no longer constants, emerges
to select the strategy with maximal R0, or with maximal r, among multiple
strategies with maximal R0. Thus, our model suggests the existence of an-
other fitness measure which is the combination of R0 and r, if our reasoning
holds in age structured and other more complex models. However, it will be
not a function which should be maximized, but a two staged procedure. The
first stage should identify the strategies maximizing the turnover coefficient,
while the second stage should find strategies with the greatest r from strate-
gies chosen in the first stage. We note that our analysis is a simplification,
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and whereas R0 = L(vi) in the models without age structure as presented
in this paper, this is not necessarily satisfied in age structured models. This
should be the subject of future research.
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Appendix A Multipopulation replicator dynamics.
Assume that we haveH individual strategies. Standard replicator dynam-
ics can be derived by rescaling the growth equation dnidt = niMi to the related
frequencies qi = ni/
∑
j nj which leads to the equation
dqi
dt = qi
[
Mi − M¯
]
(where M¯ =
∑
j qjMj). This equation describes the evolution of strategy
frequencies in the unstructured population. However, we might be interested
in the modelling of the structured population divided into subpopulations
such as different sexes, species etc. Assume that we want to decompose an
entire population into z subpopulations. Define
(A.1) kj = [kj
1
, ..., kjHj ]
as a vector of indices of strategies exhibited by individuals from the j-th
subpopulation (kji ∈ {1, ...,H}, and Hj is the number of strategies in the
j-th subpopulation). For example the notation k2 = [1, 3, 5] means that,
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in the second subpopulation there are (only) individuals with strategies 1, 3
and 5. Every strategy should belong to a single unique subpopulation. Then
according to Argasinski (2006), by the following change of coordinates
(A.2) qj = [qj
1
, ..., qjHi ] =

 qkj1∑Hj
i=1 qkji
, ...,
q
kj
Hj∑Hj
i=1 qkji

 j = 1, ..., z
we obtain a distribution of relative frequencies of strategies in the j-th
subpopulation. The distribution of proportions between subpopulations has
the form
(A.3) g = [g1, ..., gz ] =
[
H1∑
i=1
qk1i
, ...,
Hz∑
i=1
qkzi
]
,
where gj is the proportion of the j-th subpopulation. Every decomposition
into subpopulations can be reduced again to a single population model by
the opposite change of coordinates q(g, q1, ..., qz) where
(A.4) q
kji
= gjq
j
i .
When we apply the above transformations to the replicator equations,
we obtain a set of equations that describes the dynamics inside the sub-
populations (intraspecific dynamics). When the set of strategies in each
subpopulation is characterized by the vector of indices kj , then the system
of replicator equations will be:
(A.5)
dqji
dt
= qji
[
M ji − M¯
j
]
i = 1, ...,Hj − 1, j = 1, ..., z
(A.6)
dgs
dt
= gs
[
M¯ s − M¯
]
s = 1, ..., z − 1
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where M¯ s =
∑Hs
i=1 q
s
iM
s
i is the mean fitness in the s-th subpopulation
and M¯ =
∑z
s=1 gsM¯
s. In practical applications of this method to the mod-
elling of biological problems, the replicator equations can be defined on the
decomposed population. This will simplify the formulation of the model,
because when strategies are initially assigned to subpopulations, there is
then no need to change their indices. The choice of subpopulations is ar-
bitrary and depends on the biological assumptions underlying the analyzed
problem. For example, the entire population may be divided into two com-
peting subpopulations of hosts and parasites or prey and predators. On the
other hand, it may be divided into two subpopulations of males and females,
when interspecific dynamics will describe the evolution of the secondary sex
ratio, and intraspecific dynamics will describe changes of the frequencies of
strategies inside the male and female subpopulations. The subpopulations
can be divided into subsubpopulations, and the entire population may be
transformed into a complex multilevel cluster structure. However, all these
structures are equivalent to a single population replicator dynamics model.
Appendix B Derivation of equations (14) and (15) describing
selection strategies inside L-classes and change of sizes of
L-classes
Let us assume than we have m such classes with Hj different strategies
in the j-th L-class. In addition, assume that the dynamics is on the stable
size manifold. Then the initial system of the replicator equations can be
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transformed into two sets of differential equations. Firstly, the within L-
class dynamics (according to A.5):
(B.1)
dqji
dt
= qji
(
M(vji )− M¯
j
)
,
where qji is the proportion of the i-th strategy in the j-th L-class and M¯
j =
∑
w q
j
wM(v
j
w) =
∑
w q
j
wd
j
w
(
L(vjw)/L(v¯(q))− 1
)
. Secondly, the between L-
class dynamics (according to A.6):
(B.2)
dgj
dt
= gj
(
M¯ j − M¯
)
,
where gj is the proportion of the j-th L-class and M¯ = 0, since the
population is on the stable size manifold. Since for all strategies (for all
i) from the same L-class L(vji ) = L
j , after substitution of the respective
formulae into Equations (B.1) and (B.2), we obtain the equations (14) and
(15):
dqji
dt
= qji
(
djw
(
L(vji )
L(v¯(q))
− 1
)
−
∑
w
qjwd
j
w
(
L(vjw)
L(v¯(q))
− 1
))
(B.3)
= qji
(
Lj
L(v¯(q))
− 1
)(
dji −
∑
w
qjwd
j
w
)
, (B.4)
dgj
dt
= gj
(
Lj
L(v¯(q))
− 1
)∑
w
qjwd
j
w. (B.5)
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 1
From (12) we have that
dqi
dt
= diqi
(
L(vi)
L(v¯(q))
− 1
)
and so
(C.1)
(
L(vi)
L(v¯(q))
− 1
)
=
1
diqi
dqi
dt
.
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Consider any pair of strategies vi = [bi, di] and vj = [bj , dj ] from the same
L-class (i.e. L (vi) = L (vj)). Using (C.1) we obtain
1
diqi
dqi
dt
=
1
djqj
dqj
dt
⇒
∫
1
djqj
dqi =
∫
1
djqj
dqj + C ⇒
(C.2)
ln qi(t)
di
=
ln qj(t)
dj
+ C.
Considering t = 0 in equation (C.2) we obtain
(C.3) C =
ln qi(0)
di
−
ln qj(0)
dj
.
Combining (C.3) with (C.2) we obtain
ln qi(t)− ln qi(0)
di
=
ln qj(t)− ln qj(0)
dj
⇒
(C.4)
(
qi(t)
qi(0)
)1/di
=
(
qj(t)
qj(0)
)1/dj
.
Equation (C.4) holds for any pair i, j from the same L-class, so that
(
qi(t)
qi(0)
)1/di
= λ(t)⇒
qi(t) = qi(0)λ(t)
di
for some L-class specific λ(t). It is clear from equation (12) and the fact that
L(v¯(q)) is increasing whenever there is heterogeneity of L values within the
population that for the Lmax-class the corresponding value λ(t) is always
increasing and for any other class it is either always decreasing, or starts by
increasing and then eventually switches to decreasing, when the population
size passes the corresponding threshold (6). Since λ(t) is bounded above and
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below, and a monotonic function (decreasing or increasing) then it converges.
Letting λ = limt→∞ λ(t) gives
(C.5) qi = lim
t→∞
qi(t) = qi(0)λ
di .
We know that
∑
i qi = 1, thus for at least one L-class the corresponding
λ(t) should not converge to 0. The system (14),(15) shows that it will be
Lmax-class. However, the above reasoning used coordinates describing the
strategy frequencies in the whole population (a metasimplex coordinates,
Argasinski 2006). According to (A.4), qi(0) can be described in the coor-
dinates of the system (14) and (15) and after change of the indices i = kla
where l is the index of the L-class and a is the index of the strategy within
this L-class, we have qkla = glq
l
a. Thus the rest-point will contain only the L-
maximizing strategies, so that the state of the Lmax-class will be equivalent
to the state of the whole population (i.e according to (A.4) gmax = 1 and
qkmaxi = q
max
i ), but frequencies qkmaxi (0) will not sum to 1. However, from
(A.4) we have qkmaxa (0) = gmax(0)q
max
a (0). Then (C.5) for the Lmax-class can
be presented as:
(16) qmaxa = q
max
a (0)gmax(0)λ
da .
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